Unlike experimental philosophers, speculative philosophers preferred to work from principles and maxims and to reason from them to create natural philosophical theories. These theories might then be checked against observation, but this was often a post hoc element in the process. Speculative philosophers tended to proceed immediately to demonstrative systems of natural philosophy, rather than commencing with observation and experiment. The most commonly cited systems of speculative philosophy were the Aristotelian, the Epicurean and the Cartesian philosophies. 7 Experimental philosophy emerged as the dominant way to do natural philosophy in England in the latter half of the seventeenth century. However, it did have its detractors, such as Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish and John Sergeant, each of whom was critical of experimental philosophy and sided with the speculative approach. 8 Nevertheless, as experimental philosophy gained ascendancy, it began to be applied to other branches of philosophy. Of particular importance is the way it was applied to the human understanding by Locke and others, and to medicine. 9 In the eighteenth century it was also applied to moral philosophy and aesthetics. For instance, Hume's Treatise is subtitled 'an Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects'.
10
Experimental philosophy also experienced a geographical expansion. Denis Diderot and the French Philosophes, Johann Nikolaus Tetens and the German popular philosophers saw themselves as experimental philosophers (or, as the Germans used to say, observational philosophers).
11 All of these authors contrasted experimental philosophy with speculative philosophy. For instance, Diderot distinguished two kinds of philosophy, the experimental and that based on reasoning. The former has its eyes bandaged, walks always feeling its way, grasps whatever falls into its hands and finds precious things in the end. The other gathers these precious things, and tries to make a torch of them; but this pretended torch has up to the present served it less well than the gropings of its rival, and this must be so […] . 11 See, e.g., D. Diderot, Pensées sur l'interpretation de la nature (Amsterdam, 1754); J. N. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1777, repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1979), vol. 1, iiiiv, vii. 12 Diderot, Pensées, article XXIII, in Diderot Interpreter of Nature: Selected Writings, translated by J. Stewart and J. Kemp (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1937), 46: 'deux sortes de philosophies, l'expérimentale et la rationnelle. L'une a les yeux bandés, marche toujours en tâtonnant, saisit tout ce qui tombe sous les mains, et rencontre à fin des choses précieuses. L'autre recueille ces matières précieuses, et tâche de s'en former un flambeau; mais ce flambeau prétendu lui a, jusqu'à présent, moins servi que le tâtonnement à sa rivale'.
Along similar lines, German experimental philosophers rejected Kant's 'speculative metaphysics' (speculative Metaphysik) 13 because it abandoned the experimental approach in favour of 'the most abstract and profound speculations' (abstractesten und tiefsinnigsten Speculationen).
14

II
When seventeenth-century British philosophers began to distinguish between experimental and speculative natural philosophy, they were departing from a centuries-old tradition that regarded natural philosophy as a speculative discipline. That tradition had its roots in Aristotle's classification of the branches of knowledge.
Aristotle proposed that there are three types of knowledge: theoretical, practical and productive (although he sometimes alluded to a bipartite division between theoretical and non-theoretical types of knowledge). Productive knowledge includes rhetoric and art. Practical knowledge concerns how we ought to behave. It includes ethics and politics. Theoretical knowledge aims at truth. It includes metaphysics, natural philosophy or the study of nature, as well as mathematics.
15
All of the different branches of knowledge were to be subsumed under this tripartite division. Aristotle also distinguished between the practical intellect and the speculative intellect in De anima and Nichomachean Ethics.
16
It would be wrong to think, however, that Aristotle's division of knowledge was the only division to exert an influence up to the time when the experimental/speculative distinction emerged. The Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics (including metaphysics and mathematics) and ethics was well known and adopted, among others, by John Locke.
17 Indeed, philosophers in the medieval, Renaissance and early modern periods put forward many alternative classifications besides the Aristotelian and Stoic ones.
18 Joseph S. Freedman holds that divisions of philosophy 'numbered in the thousands during the sixteenth and seventeenth century' alone. 19 However, the Aristotelian classification and its variations were the most widespread in the early modern period 13 E. Platner, Neue Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise: Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Physiologie, Pathologie, Moralphilosophie und Aesthetik (Leipzig, 1790), vol. 1, Preface, sig. a5. 14 J. G. H. Feder, Ueber Raum und Caussalität zur Prüfung der kantischen Philosophie (Göttingen, 1787), xviii. Feder's sketches of the experimental approach can be found in Ueber Raum und Caussalität, ix-x, and in his Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen, dessen Naturtriebe, Verschiedenheiten, Verhältniß zur Tugend und Glückseligkeit und die Grundregeln, die menschlichen Gemüther zu erkennen und zu regieren (Göttingen, 1779 According to Aquinas, there are two objects for the main operations of the rational soul, the good and the true. The former is apprehended by the practical intellect, the latter by the speculative intellect. 20 The speculative intellect is that aspect of reason which is concerned with the true. The speculative intellect operates using speculative principles, such as 'the whole is greater than the part'. The deliverances of the speculative intellect are necessary truths. The knowledge generated is speculative knowledge. The practical intellect, by contrast, operates using practical principles, but does not produce necessary truths. This is practical knowledge. 21 Aquinas has a lengthy discussion in the Summa theologica on the question as to whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. He is inclined to think that they are not.
22
This simple summary of Aquinas's views is hardly adequate to capture the sophistication of his position, but it is enough to show that in the Western tradition, under the influence of Aristotle, a speculative/practical distinction of disciplinary domains found its application in faculty psychology in the distinction between speculative and practical intellect, and a concomitant twofold distinction of speculative and practical knowledge which, in turn, were founded upon speculative and practical principles. Many early modern authors associated disciplinary domains with mental faculties: among others, Tommaso Campanella; 23 During the Renaissance Franciscus Toletus, a Jesuit philosopher and teacher at the prestigious Collegio Romano, followed Aristotle by dividing philosophy into speculative, practical and factive. Speculative philosophy consists in metaphysics, mathematics (pure and applied, or mathematica media) and physics. Physics is natural philosophy and it deals with objects that are perceptible via the senses. Metaphysics deals with the principles and properties that are common to all being. Practical philosophy includes ethics, oeconomy (that studies the management of family) and politics. Factive philosophy includes the productive arts and is called mechanica.
27 Toletus's tripartite distinction is equivalent to Aristotle's division of knowledge into practical, theoretical and productive.
In the early seventeenth century the German natural philosopher Daniel Sennert accepted Toletus's partitions of theoretical and practical philosophy. 28 However, Sennert criticized Toletus for including the factive disciplines in philosophy because 'they do neither contemplate things divine; nor do they regulate these actions which are proper to Man; nor is honesty the thing they aime at, but Profit, nor does the chief good and Felicity of man consist in them'. 29 'And who is there that dares reckon Smiths, Carpenters, Joyners, Weavers and such like Artificers, amongst Phylosophers?' 30 Instead, Sennert opts for the twofold distinction:
I, for my part, take that to be the truest division of Phylosophy, which is delivered by Aristotle in the Second Book of his Metaphysics, Chap. I. and retained by all sorts of interpreters, viz. into Speculative and Practical. The Speculative part, is that which contemplates all beings or things, with their Principles and Affections or Qualifications, only for knowledg and truths sake: But the practical part of Phylosophy is that whose subject is the Actions of Men […]. As for natural philosophy, Sennert holds that it is a science because 'it demonstrates in a necessary subject the proper affections by the proper Causes: as very many demonstrations touching things natural, do witness'.
32 Natural philosophy is a 'speculative science', rather than a practical science. However, Sennert claims with Zabarella that it is 'superfluous to ad the term speculative, seeing if we take the word Science properly, all Sciences are speculative'. 33 Ethics, oeconomy and politics are sciences only in a broad sense of the term.
34
A comparison of Toletus's and Sennert's views shows that, even among the adopters of the Aristotelian divisions, there was some degree of variety. However, there is one claim on which nearly all authors that distinguished between speculative and practical philosophy before Bacon agreed. This was the claim that natural philosophy was a speculative, theoretical or contemplative discipline, rather than a practical, operative or productive discipline.
35
Classifications of natural philosophy as a speculative, theoretical or contemplative discipline could be found among Italian Humanists 36 and Aristotelians, 37 Iberian Jesuits, 38 French Scholastics, 39 German academics, 40 German and Dutch physicians 41 and the authors of the manuals used and criticized by English experimental philosophers. 42 Even the post-Ramist Clemens Timpler, who disagreed with most of his contemporaries in regarding natural philosophy as an art rather than a science, was quick to add that it was a speculative art, rather than a practical or a productive art. 43 
III
There were, however, in the middle ages and the Renaissance, other approaches to the study of nature that were not purely speculative and these, to some extent, anticipated the experimental natural philosophy developed in the early Royal Society. For example, the thirteenth-century philosopher Roger Bacon promoted a practical method for the acquisition of knowledge of the natural world that combined the use of mathematics and detailed descriptions of natural phenomena. Bacon singled out a new discipline that was supposed to apply this method. He called it experiential science (scientia experimentalis), distinguishing it from the more speculative discipline of natural philosophy. According to Bacon, experiential science has three aims. First, it should provide mathematical descriptions of natural phenomena based on empirical evidence, rather than demonstrative reasonings from principles. Second, it should discover instruments, medical cures and military technologies and it should make chemical discoveries. Third, it should prognosticate 'the future on the basis of astronomical/astrological knowledge'. 44 Experiential science, therefore, has practical purposes and it relies on observations and experiments. Nevertheless, Roger Bacon did not advocate a systematic and extensive use of controlled experiments, nor did he put forward a theory, methodology or philosophy of experiment. 45 It is telling that 'for his description of the first example of an experimental science, the study of the rainbow, Bacon depends on the accounts handed down by Aristotle, Seneca and Avicenna', although 'he is not uncritical of these accounts'. 46 Hence, we should not overestimate the degree to which Roger Bacon's experiential science anticipates either experimental science as we currently understand it, or the experimental natural philosophy advocated by Robert Boyle and the members of the early Royal Society.
It is unlikely that many first-generation experimental philosophers read Roger Bacon's texts, given their predilection for works written in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 47 However, a text that was widely read in late sixteenth-and seventeenth-century England took inspiration from Roger Bacon's scientia experimentalis to advocate the introduction of an operative, non-speculative form of natural philosophy. This was John Dee's Mathematical/Praeface to the English translation of Euclid's Elements, first published in 1570. 48 At the end of his classification of mathematical disciplines, Dee introduces the new discipline of 'archemastrie' which teacheth to bryng to actuall experience sensible, all worthy conclusions by all the Artes Mathematicall purposed, & by true Naturall Philosophie concluded: & both addeth to them a farder scope, in the termes of the same Artes, & also by hys propre Method, and in peculier termes, procedeth, with helpe of the foresayd Artes [scil. the mathematical arts], to the performance of complet Experiences, which of no particular Art, are hable (Formally) to be challenged.
[…] Science I may call it, rather, then an Arte: for the excellency and Mastershyp it hath, over so many, and so mighty Artes and Sciences. And bycause it procedeth by Experiences, and searcheth forth the causes of Conclusions, by Experiences: and also putteth the Conclusions them selves, in Experience, it is named of some, Scientia Experimentalis. The Experimentall Science. Nicolaus Cusanus termeth it so, in hys Experiments Statikall, And an other Philosopher, of this land Native [scil. Roger Bacon] […] The Arte carrieth with it, a wonderful Credit: By reason, it certifieth, sensibly, fully, and completely to the utmost power of Nature, and Arte. This Arte, certifieth by Experience complete and absolute: and other Artes, with their Argumentes, and Demonstrations, persuade: and in wordes, prove very well their Conclusions. But wordes, and Arguments, are no sensible certifying: nor the full and finall frute of Sciences practisable. 49 This passage is highly suggestive, not least because it contains one of the earliest occurrences of the expression 'experimental science' in English. 50 Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the extent to which Dee's archemastrie anticipates modern experimental science or early modern experimental philosophy. By deciphering Dee's cryptic references toward the end of the Mathematicall Praeface, Nicholas Clulee has established that archemastrie combines the empirical verification of natural philosophical claims with magical practices such as divination by mirrors and reflecting surfaces. 51 What archemastrie most clearly anticipates is Francis Bacon's operative natural philosophy, which is, we shall argue, a close antecedent of experimental natural philosophy. Like operative natural philosophy, archemastrie does not replace traditional, speculative natural philosophy. It complements it by adding 'a farder scope'. Unlike traditional, speculative natural philosophy, archemastrie does not rely on demonstrative reasoning: 'it procedeth by Experiences, and searcheth forth the causes of Conclusions, by Experiences: and also putteth the Conclusions them selves, in Experience'. It is an 'Experimentall Science' in the broad, early modern sense of the term 'experimental', best rendered in current language as 'experiential': that is, it relies on observations and experiments. Insofar as it 'procedeth […] to the performance of complet Experiences', including observations, experiments and magical practices, archemastrie is an operative discipline. This induces Dee to call it an art, although it could also be called a science for 'its excellency and Mastershyp'. Archemastrie sits uneasily between the realms of art and science, unlike Bacon's operative philosophy that he firmly places within the domain of natural philosophy. In order to understand Bacon's reasons for introducing an operative, non-speculative component of natural philosophy, we need to turn to the disciplinary status of two disciplines: natural magic and mechanics.
IV
Typically, early modern classifications of the disciplines did not include any form of magic within the realm of natural science. This was not because of a widespread scepticism about magic. The same authors who denied the status of natural science to magic often defended natural magic as a perfectly respectable activity. Natural magic, as distinct from demonic, or black, magic, aimed to bring about effects that may seem preternatural by exploiting the hidden natural powers of things. 52 Given its practical purposes, natural magic could not be part of a purely theoretical science like natural philosophy. 53 Many practitioners and advocates of natural magic thought otherwise. They regarded it as 'the pinnacle of natural philosophy and its most complete achievement' (philosophiae naturalis apicem, eiusque absolutissimam consummationem), as Agrippa wrote in 1533. 54 If natural magic was a part of natural philosophy, then it was a science. Fifty years after Agrippa, Giambattista della Porta wrote about magic: 'They that have been most skilful in dark and hidden points of learning, do call this knowledge the very highest point, and the perfection of natural Sciences' (Reconditioris literaturae viri scientissimi eam ipsam naturalium scientiarium apicem […] esse dicunt).
55
Magical texts included highly theoretical treatments of the so-called scientia of magic, like that of Ficino, but they also included purely technical manuals and collections of recipes. Della Porta brought out this practical aspect of magic by alluding to a famous statement by Pico della Mirandola: 'Others have named it the practical part of natural philosophy, which produces her effects by the mutual and fit application of one natural thing unto another' (Alii activam naturalis Philosophiae portionem prodiderunt, effectus suos ex mutua, & opportuna applicatione producentem).
56 Like other practitioners, della Porta aimed to combine the theoretical and practical aspects of natural magic. His Twenty Books of Natural Magic combined an exposition of Ficino's theory of magic with a collection of techniques and recipes. 57 Della Porta would have agreed with Tommaso Campanella's description of natural magic as a 'speculative and at the same time practical' (speculativa […] ac simul practica) form of wisdom.
58
Francis Bacon was highly critical of his predecessors' magical practices, yet he agreed with della Porta and Campanella in regarding natural magic as a science and a part of natural philosophy, but also as a practical or operative discipline. These two features are apparent in Bacon's definition of magic as 'the science which applies the knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderful operations' (scientia quae cognitionem Formarum Abditarum ad opera admiranda deducat). 59 Regarding operative character, meant introducing an operative, non-speculative part of natural philosophy, as Bacon did as early as 1605 in The Advancement of Learning.
60
The disciplinary shifts that led to the genesis of operative natural philosophy did not only concern natural magic. They also concerned what was sometimes called 'mathematical magic', that is, mechanics. 61 In the Renaissance, mechanics was typically classified as an art, not as a science (or more precisely, as a scientia). This classification was accepted by Toletus, who, as we have seen, called the productive arts mechanica, and also by Tomeo, a humanist scholar who published an early Latin translation of the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems (Quaestiones mechanicae) in 1525. 62 This classification would be challenged fifty years later, when the Paduan philosopher Alessandro Piccolomini published a widely read paraphrase of the Mechanical Problems. Piccolomini no longer regarded mechanics as an art, but as a scientia. Like another Paduan Aristotelian, Giuseppe Moletti, Piccolomini classed mechanics as a part of speculative philosophy, more precisely of mathematics. 63 He did not regard it as a part of natural philosophy because the latter concerns natural motions, whereas mechanics concerns unnatural, violent motions. 64 However, mechanics was typically concerned with ways of effecting unnatural motions for practical purposes. The Aristotelians acknowledged that being 'directed towards human ends' was '[t]he chief characteristic of mechanics'. 65 Therefore, mechanics sat uneasily within the realm of the speculative sciences.
Given the practical purpose of mechanics, it should not be surprising that Francesco Maurolico (or Maurolyco), one of the leading mathematicians of the sixteenth century, classed mechanics, together with ethics, as a part of practical philosophy. 66 By contrast, he classed physics, that is, natural philosophy, and mathematics as parts of speculative philosophy. Yet mechanics was closely associated with those disciplines. It was often regarded as a mixed discipline, deriving from the combination of mathematics with physics. For instance, Maurolico regarded all mechanical theory (ratio) as intermediate between mathematics and mechanics. 67 For Niccolò Tartaglia, another eminent writer on mechanics, the whole of mechanics derived in part from mathematics and in part from natural philosophy. 68 Attempts to classify mechanics appear to have reached an impasse. On the one hand, its classification as a speculative science was at odds with its practical orientation. On the other hand, its classification as a practical science did little justice to its intimate connection with the allegedly speculative sciences of mathematics and natural philosophy. Bacon's classification of natural philosophy provides an interesting resolution to this problem. Rejecting the scholastic distinction between natural and violent motions, he classified mechanics as an operative science, which was correlated to physics on the speculative side of natural philosophy. He grouped mechanics with magic, which itself was correlated to speculative metaphysics. 69 Thus, Bacon's schema has a robust operative, that is, non-speculative, side to natural philosophy. Furthermore, Bacon also identified a form of mechanics that he regarded as a constituent of natural history. 70 This grafting in of mechanics to the operative side of natural philosophy and the intimate connection between mechanics and natural history provided an important precedent for the inclusion of mechanics as a part of experimental philosophy later in the century. It reflected the conviction of a growing number of intellectuals that the technical subjects were highly relevant to natural philosophy. The Spanish Humanist Juan Luis Vives, while a tutor at the English court, had exhorted scholars to pay attention to technical problems regarding the construction of machines, agriculture, weaving and navigation as early as 1531. 71 Georgius Agricola's widely read De re metallica (Of Metals), published in Basel in 1556, 'clearly illustrated the relevance of craft knowledge to an understanding of the nature of the world'. 72 Around 1562, Sir Humphrey Gilbert linked natural philosophy to the teaching of technical subjects in his plan for Queen Elizabeth's Academy. 73 Then in 1600, William Gilbert availed himself of works published by craftsmen in his De magnete, where he combined a natural-philosophical discussion of magnetism with technical discussions of problems of navigation, nautical instruments, techniques for fusing metals and problems of mining engineering. 74 At the same time, a mechanicist philosophy of nature was emerging, according to which living beings and the whole world are machines operating according to mechanical regularities. 75 This implies that those laws apply to natural and unnatural motions and, hence, are objects of study of natural philosophy. Many experimental philosophers would embrace this view. It provided an even stronger underpinning for the inclusion of the non-speculative, operative discipline of mechanics within natural philosophy than Bacon offered. Francis Bacon's mature schema for philosophy is found in his De augmentis scientiarum of 1623. Bacon's basic tripartite division of knowledge is into history, poesy and philosophy. These divisions correspond, for Bacon, to the three intellectual faculties of memory, imagination and reason. He divides the third branch of knowledge, philosophy, into three: of the deity, of nature and of man. 76 Philosophy of nature, as we have seen, is divided into speculative and operative. Speculative philosophy is divided into metaphysics and physics. Operative philosophy is divided into mechanics and magic.
Bacon's operative/speculative distinction contains one very important development on that of Toletus: it pertains to natural philosophy and not to philosophy in general. A further, minor, difference is that Bacon regards mathematics as a branch of metaphysics rather than as a part of speculative philosophy in its own right. Moreover, it is worth pointing out given developments later in the century, that for Bacon natural history is one of three parts of history, but that its content overlaps with physics in speculative philosophy and with mechanics in operative philosophy. For Bacon, natural history and natural philosophy are, therefore, not discrete disciplines. 77 The profound influence of Bacon's reconfiguring of natural philosophy is nicely illustrated in the work of John Johnston. 78 Johnston was a natural historian who spent much of his adult life on the Continent and published in Latin. His work has generally escaped notice amongst historians of English science, but he studied in Cambridge and London and seems to represent a fairly independent voice concerning developments in natural philosophy in the period before the establishment of the Royal Society. Johnston's two natural histories, shaped by his Millenarian pedagogical ideals, occupy an intermediate position 'between the works of his humanist predecessors and those of his more resolutely empirical successors'. 79 Johnston adopts a conventional twofold division of philosophy in his Naturae constantia of 1634, translated into English in 1657: 'But Philosophie being either speculative, or practicall, and that we speak of in this part [i.e. speculative philosophy] comprehends under it, Metaphysicks, Physickes, and Mathematickes […]'. 80 As one might expect, in his discussion of metaphysics he refers to a gallery of scholastics: Averroes, Thomas, Scotus, Sánchez, Suarez, Fonseca and Masius.
We note here, however, one absolutely crucial development. This is the claim that 'the practick part of Philosophy was, till now, in the greatest darknesse; at last in our age the way to it was opened by famons [sic] Verulam […] in his New Organum, his Sylva Silvarum, his Historie of Life and Death, and of Windes'. 81 From the wider context it is clear that Johnston is referring to the practical part of natural philosophy.
Johnston's picture of natural philosophy is a transitional one. It begins looking just like that of Sennert, with the standard divisions and with reference to scholastic masters' treatments of metaphysics. But when he discusses the advances in natural philosophy, he regards Bacon's Novum organum and his exemplar natural histories as being representative instances of the practical part of natural philosophy, even though natural philosophy is classified as a speculative science.
V
It is now time to draw some conclusions from the foregoing discussion. First, it is clear that there are some salient discontinuities between the experimental/speculative distinction in the early modern period and the practical/speculative distinction that derived ultimately from Aristotle. From the 1660s the experimental/speculative distinction is an all-encompassing division pertaining to natural philosophy. By contrast, the speculative/operative distinction, from Aquinas through Toletus to Johnston, pertains to philosophy in general and not to natural philosophy in particular. The main exception to this obvious discontinuity is the position of Francis Bacon, who restricts the speculative/operative distinction to natural philosophy. It may be that this fundamental Baconian shift was an important factor in the emergence of the experimental/speculative distinction in England in the 1660s. Whatever the case, this shift of domain of application from philosophy to natural philosophy represents a crucial development.
Ironically, however, by the mid-eighteenth century the experimental/speculative distinction was applied to philosophy in general, though this was not a return to the old operative/speculative distinction deriving from Aristotle, but rather it stemmed from a desire to apply the prevailing method of natural philosophy to other branches of philosophy. For example, allusions to the experimental method of the experimental philosophy were commonplace in Scottish moral philosophy. A second, related discontinuity is that natural philosophy changed from being a speculative science to being either a speculative or an operative (i.e., experimental) science. To be sure, this transition occurred over a number of generations as a result, inter alia, of the re-evaluation of the status of mechanics and magic and the role of experiment. But by the mid-seventeenth century the broader conception of natural philosophy adumbrated by Francis Bacon and others had become the dominant view.
In spite of this, remnants of the Renaissance view persisted well into the early modern period. For example, we can see the persistence of the scholastic distinction between speculative and practical principles in John Locke's early Essays on the Law of Nature of c.1664:
If the law of nature were written in our hearts, it would have to be inferred that speculative as well as practical principles are inscribed. But this seems difficult to prove; for if we try to search out the first and best known principle of the sciences (namely, that it is impossible that the same thing should at the same time both be and not be), it will be readily agreed that this principle is not inscribed by nature as an axiom in our hearts nor taken for granted by anyone before he has either learned it from another or (which is the proper method of establishing principles) proved it to himself by induction and by observing particulars. Thus it appears to me that no principles, either practical or speculative, are written in the minds of men by nature. 83 Of course, this is the kernel of Book I of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690), in which he dismisses innate speculative and practical principles.
A third point of discontinuity is that scholastic faculty psychology, which underpinned the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge and principles, drops out of the picture. Given that the experimental/speculative distinction emerged as a way of demarcating approaches to the practice of natural philosophy, it is hardly surprising that faculty psychology is virtually completely absent in the writings of the early Fellows of the Royal Society and those promoters of the experimental philosophy within their ambit. Few, if any, natural philosophers had time for the theory of the speculative and practical intellect, for they were concerned rather with the method of acquiring knowledge of nature through observation and experiment. 84 This is not true, however, of religious discourse where the terms remained in use well into the seventeenth century. Take for example the divine Richard Baxter who mentions the practical intellect in both his Saints' Everlasting Rest (1654) and his Catholick Theologie: Plain, Pure, Peaceable (1675). 85 Another absolutely decisive difference between the experimental/speculative distinction and the traditional operative/speculative distinction is the fact that the content of the operative side is completely redefined. From the time of Aristotle the operative part of philosophy had typically included ethics, politics and oeconomy, or some variant. As we have seen, however, in the work of Francis Bacon, the operative branch of natural philosophy includes mechanics and magic.
Moreover, as we have seen, in the De augmentis scientiarum Bacon claims that ' [t] here is also a kind of Mechanic often merely empirical and operative, which does not depend on Physic; but this I have remitted to Natural History, taking it away from Natural Philosophy' (Mechanicam saepius mere empiricam et operariam, quae a Physica non pendeat; verum hanc in Historiam Naturalem conjecimus, a Philosophia Naturali segregamus).
86 While a full exposition of Bacon's view is not possible here, it is important to point out that, for Bacon, natural history has three subjects, namely generations, pretergenerations (monsters) and arts or mechanics. What he claims in the De augmentis scientiarum is that one aspect of the operative part of natural philosophy belongs to natural history. In other words, Bacon identifies a type of mechanics in the operative branch of natural philosophy with mechanics or arts in natural history.
Proceeding chronologically, it is natural to view the schema of John Johnston as providing a transitional view in so far as he speaks of the operative part of philosophy in terms of Bacon's natural histories. And by the time that the experimental/speculative distinction emerged in the 1660s, the operative part had come to be entirely characterised in terms of observation and experiment. This brings us to another important development: operative, or practical, philosophy becomes experimental.
At some point in the decades between the death of Bacon and the founding of the Royal Society, natural philosophers in England ceased to speak of the operative, or practical, part of philosophy and began to speak of experimental philosophy. This is explicitly acknowledged by Henry Oldenburg, the first Secretary of the Royal Society, who gives a very interesting potted history of the emergence of the experimental philosophy:
[I]n the last Age, when Operative Philosophy began to recover ground, and to tread on the heels of triumphant Philology; emergent adventures and great successes were encountered by dangerous oppositions and strong obstructions: Galilaeus and others in Italy suffered extremities for their Celestial Discoveries; and here in England Sr. Walter Raleigh, when he was in his greatest luster, was notoriously slaundered, to have erected a School of Atheism, because he gave contenance to Chymistry, to practical Arts, and to curious Mechanical Operations, and design'd to form the best of them into a Colledge. And Queen Elizabeths Gilbert was a long time esteem'd extravagant for his Magnetismes; and Harvey for his diligent researches in pursuance of the Circulation of the Blood.
But, when our renowed Lord Bacon had demonstrated the Methods for a perfect Restauration of all parts of Real knowledge; and the Generous and Philosophical Peyreskus had, soon after, agitated in all parts to redeem the most instructive Antiquities, and to excite Experimental Essays, and fresh Discoveries; The success became on a sudden stupendious, and Effective philosophy began to sparkle, and even to flow into beams of bright-shining Light, all over the World. 87 Oldenburg's potted history tells us whom he regarded as seminal contributors to the emergence of the experimental philosophy, but it does not give us any inkling into the emergence of the expression 'experimental philosophy'. Unlike 'scientia experimentalis' that was used all over Europe, 88 98 However, Cabeo, and especially Kircher, did not disdain speculation and did not conceive of the experimental and speculative approaches as alternative methodologies in the field of natural philosophy.
Interestingly, recent work by Peter Harrison has revealed that by the time Hartlib, Cabeo and Kircher started using the expression 'experimental philosophy', the term 'experimental', in contrast to 'speculative', was already in common use in the religious literature. For example, in 1606 Arthur Dent compared the reprobate with the elect in the following terms:
The knowledge of the reprobate doth puffe up. The knowledge of the elect doth humble.
[…] The knowledge of the elect is spirituall, and experimentall. The knowledge of the reprobate is speculative. 99 More work needs to be done on these very interesting semantic developments, 100 but what is clear is that the experimental terminology was not the exclusive domain of natural philosophers and that there were multiple sources from which the terminology of the new approach to natural philosophy could have drawn. No doubt as the experimental work of Galileo, Torricelli, Harvey and others became well known, the importance of experiment in the acquisition of knowledge of nature emerged as the prominent feature of the practice of the new philosophy. A case in point is Francis Bacon, in whose later writings we find a nascent philosophy of experiment, which was to have a strong influence on the natural philosophers of the early Royal Society and beyond. 101 Last, but not least, is the development of an antagonism between experimental and speculative philosophy. In England, there was a precedent for this in Francis Bacon's warnings against the illinformed development of theories, his idols of the theatre and natural philosophical speculations that lacked adequate observations and experiments. 102 On the Continent, the antagonism between experiment and speculation could be found in the medical debates that unfolded in the Netherlands between the 1640s and the 1660s. Physicians like Cornelis van Hogelande and Franciscus de le Boë Sylvius contrasted the speculative conclusions of the Cartesians, derived by way of reasoning (ratiocinatio) from mechanistic principles, with Harvey's 'real and sensual disquisitions' (disquisitiones reales & sensuales), that is, experiments and observations.
